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ABSTRACT 
 
Euphrase Kezilahabi, a Tanzanian poet, novelist and scholar, is an ontological and African 
interpreter of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. He transfers and rewrites Western 
philosophy in an African way, transforming philosophical concepts into metaphors or oniric 
images. These elements emerge in his PhD thesis where he explicitly speaks about the 
importance of the concepts of Being in Heidegger and the concept of Time in Nietzsche. African 
Being for Kezilahabi is being a prisoner because of pride of ethnicity, pride of Africanness and 
ethnic morality. That imprisons African Being and makes African leaders profit from the 
manipulation of these elements. According to Kezilahabi, these elements tend to make Africans 
think in a Fascist way. One of the key features of Kezilahabi’s philosophy is liberation. And so 
it is a philosophy of freedom, with very different meanings, which is the subject of this article. 
Kezilahabi’s philosophy is concerned with liberation. He meditates on the concept of time, 
taking as his cue the ancient question of “Western” philosophy as to whether time is circular or 
linear. He uses African elements to resolve this question, and the result is not only African but 
universal. His philosophy is not a summary of the influences from Western philosophy, but an 
original deep philosophy by one of the greatest African writers. This article will show his 
rewriting of these concepts and their political, social and philosophical valence.  
 
Keywords: Swahili poetry, Kezilahabi, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Rewriting, Transferring, Eternal 
Return, Nagona, Overhuman, Liberating, Freedom, Philosophy. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 CONNECTIONS 
 
The loss of a ‘home country’ is an effect of the search for truth, of the re-thinking 
and reconsidering of all certainties, whether moral, ethical, spiritual, juridical, etc. 
This loss and the consequent “death of God” are necessary to begin the unmasking 
of all collective agreements and to liberate man in his essence. Unmasking is the 
first point in order to arrive at truth and to be free. This is the basis for the advent 
of a new human being, a free and creative human, who is named by Nietzsche 
Übermensch (Overhuman). This is what we can read in Also Sprach Zarathustra: 
Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, 
2006 [1883–1885]) and Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift (‘On 
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Genealogy of Morality’, 2007 [1887]) by Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as in the 
interpretation of Nietzsche given by Martin Heidegger in Einleitung in die 
Philosophie: Denken und Dichten (‘Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and 
Poetizing’, 2011 [1944–45]). The Swahili writer Euphrase Kezilahabi (born in 
Namagondo, Ukerewe Island in 1944) in many cases follows the interpretation of 
Heidegger for the hermeneutic of Nietzsche: 
There is need to point out to the reader that the word of Nietzsche “God is 
dead” is understood here in a Heideggerian way, that the destining of two 
millennia of Western history in which supersensory world made real by 
the Christian interpretation of philosophy (the ideas, God, the moral law, 
the authority of reason, progress, the happiness of the greatest number, 
culture, civilization) suffer the loss of their constructive force and become 
void. (Kezilahabi 1985: 426). 
 
This process of loss results, as Kezilahabi pointed out, in a form of suffering: “We 
also do agree with Nietzsche that suffering man is always on the way to truth” 
(1985: 238). Nietzsche and Heidegger are two of the philosophers who have 
deeply investigated human nature and the collective agreements. Each one in a 
different way revolutionised the history of thinking as commented by Kezilahabi: 
“These philosophers lay bare the nature of the Western world. They are eye-
openers.” (Kezilahabi 1985: 5). These German philosophers are fundamental in 
the thinking of one of the biggest African writers: the Swahili writer Euphrase 
Kezilahabi. Not only because they are akin in relation to themes and methodology, 
but also because Kezilahabi thinks that what the African Being needs is a process 
of liberation (Kezilahabi 1985: 5, 6, 357–362). In this sense, he transfers 
methodology and fights against “concept-mummies” or “tragedy of errors” 
(1985: 357) and rewrites the concepts and metaphors of the two German 
philosophers. Kezilahabi (1985: 5) speaks about a “liberating criticism” that “will 
be materialistic because it will seek or interpret all phenomena in their 
changingness and development as they interact with other phenomena. In this way 
it will overcome that static outlook of truth inherent in African metaphysics of 
traditional man.” The importance of Nietzsche and Heidegger’s thinking is so 
relevant to Kezilahabi that some elements of his works are a result of rewriting or 
transferring meaning from the works of the German philosophers. Thus, as 
Kezilahabi writes (1985: 239): “We shall use Heideggerian, Nietzschean and 
Marxian lenses on our own eyes, and we shall try as much as possible not to bring 
into our discussion vulgar anthropology”. 
Therefore, this article concerns the rewriting and transferring of meaning and 
as such it is related to studies of the reception of Nietzsche and Heidegger. In this 
sense translation is understood as dialogue between texts. Here it is proposed as 
an analysis of transfer and rewriting by comparing the texts1. The central point, 
                                                 
1  The texts are certainly known by Kezilahabi, because they are in the bibliography of his 
dissertation (1985): 1) Heidegger: Being and Time, Basic Writings; Nietzsche; On Time and 
Being; On the Way to Language; Poetry, Language, Thought; The Question Concerning 
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which underpins other concepts, is the process of liberation (freedom) of 
Kezilahabi. For him, freedom coincides with truth, therefore, liberation and the 
search for truth coincide, and thus describe the duties of literature and existential 
issues. 
 
  
1.2 AROUND TRANSLATIONS 
 
Even-Zohar (1990: 20) includes translation in the broader domain of transfer in 
order to emphasise the relation between transfer and transformation, and in order 
to emphasise the dynamism and movement of texts. André Lefevere, for his part, 
includes translation in the broader domain of rewriting in order to contribute “to 
the study of literature and culture by showing the value of studying translations 
as elements that play an analysable part in the manipulation of the words and 
concepts which, among other things, constitute power in a culture” (quoted in 
Marinetti 2011: 27).  
The rewritings analysed in this article are not an isolated and completely 
rewritten version of another text. Rewriting is a singular but constituent element 
of Kezilahabi’s works. This is essentially for three reasons: first, the difference of 
genre between the source texts and Kezilahabi’s works; second, Kezilahabi’s 
intention of not making a direct link between his text and the other; third, in re-
thinking and reconsidering he cannot accept an already closed and codified text 
(according to Kezilahabi, Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s texts are the best 
exemplum of unmasking the Western Weltanschuung, or ‘worldview’, but 
because of their fame they are already “classic” and, to some extent, codified). In 
the same way, Itamar Even-Zohar describes the transfer process as “the 
procedures by which textual models in one system are transferred to another, from 
canonized to non-canonized literature” (1981: 2).  
In Kezilahabi’s view, the methodology and the process of liberation are 
fundamental. Indeed, Kezilahabi transfers Nietzsche’s concept of narcoticum to 
an African context. As a remedy for narcosis, he offers the tonicum, an important 
existential and aesthetic value (1985: 238–9, 249, 264, 272,). This is necessary in 
order to search for truth which coincides with freedom. That is why freedom is 
the key concept of this analysis, because it is the goal of the liberation process and 
the goal of the search for truth. Tonicum is a bitter medicament, so this search 
causes pain. The pain can assume different aspects e.g. solitude and homelessness 
(this is because the Heimat (home) is transferred from Nietzsche to Kezilahabi 
through Heidegger, as we will see in the next paragraphs). At the same time, pain 
                                                 
Technology and Other Essays; What is Called Thinking? 2) Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy; 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Indeed, for directly rewriting we use only the texts that are present in 
this bibliography Heidegger (1996, 2007) and Nietzsche (2000), and for transfer, Heidegger 
(2011, also in this bibliography) and Nietzsche (2011). This last text it is not in the bibliography, 
but transfers are also possible via Heidegger (cf. Texts of Heidegger in the bibliography, such 
as Nietzsche and Poetry Language, Thought). 
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is an effect of this search and is indispensable to it and for an existential process 
of liberation.  
One aspect of pain is the sense of homelessness, which coincides with the 
interpretation by Heidegger of Nietzsche’s search and the idea of search as a 
journey. As mentioned before, the importance of Heidegger and Nietzsche for 
Kezilahabi and the intertextual dialogue between them allows us beyond a simple 
affinity. For example, the key concept of liberation in Kezilahabi and Nietzsche 
involves the concept of tonicum, that means Kezilahabi proposes to do as 
Nietzsche did “We need a critique of moral values, the value of these values 
should itself, for once, be examined” (2007: 7). Therefore, other elements are 
directly rewritten. Rewriting is “the primary way in which cultures construct 
images and representations of authors, texts and entire periods of history” 
(Marinetti 2011: 27). Kezilahabi’s rewritings are, on the one hand, an adaptation 
to the Swahili linguistic code, and on the other an adaptation to Kezilahabi’s 
original cultural context on Ukerewe Island. Furthermore, the rewriting can 
involve both adaptations. In his essay “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation”, 
Roman Jakobson (2002) speaks about these characteristics and potentialities of 
translation, which for him make it more than “translation proper” (in Pym 2010: 
108). Thus, transferring and rewriting correspond to Jakobson’s idea of 
translation.  
Using the categories of Jakobson we can say that they are an intralingual 
translation, because they are a rewording of something far away in space and/or 
time. In addition to that, transferring and rewriting constitute an interlingual 
translation, because they are “an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some 
other language” (Jakobson 1995: 53). In this case, in a certain sense we can claim 
with Jakobson’s words that Kezilhabi’s rewritings are a re-creation, as far as they 
are related to poetry (Jakobson 1995: 61–62). Therefore, the elements discussed 
in this article are not a mere translation, but an original re-thinking and 
reconsideration of sources. The relation that Kezilahabi has with sources is always 
comparison, which lets Kezilahabi transfer and rewrite concepts of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. The focus of this article is to analyse how transfer and rewriting 
contribute to the construction of Kezilahabi’s thoughts by comparing texts that 
were written far apart in time and place. We chose the concept of liberation as the 
central point of this analysis, because, following Kezilahabi’s dissertation of PhD. 
it involves other questions such as pain, tradition, existence, time, understanding, 
truth, etc.  
 
 
1.3 OVERVIEW 
 
Indeed, the first section starts with the concept of pain, as expressed in the first 
collection of poems, which for Kezilahabi is necessary in the search of truth (for 
him truth and freedom coincide). The search for truth and freedom (liberating) 
presupposes a journey (at least allegoric), which calls upon homelessness. In this 
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sense, homelessness is analysed with Freudian tools. In the second section, we 
continue with the concept of homelessness as a necessary safari (journey that will 
been indicated as transfer itself) to a double process of liberation: 1) liberation 
from supremacy of morality and ethnicity 2) liberation from the Western world-
view. The focus of the third section is the ontological categories of being and time 
by the analysis of rewriting concepts like Eternal return, Overhuman, Be-there-
with and Difference (Between-rift). For these reasons, the analysis proposed here 
is comparative and hermeneutic. This comparative analysis involves different 
texts from these authors following Kezilahabi’s poetics. The texts of Nietzsche 
and Heidegger identified in a previous analysis and translation (Gaudioso 2010a 
and 2013b/2015), which allowed us to be able to individuate these concepts and 
then compare these with the dissertation of his PhD, where he openly speaks about 
it, confirming the previous analysis. Furthermore, what we propose here is an 
analysis of the relationship between the texts, thus, how German philosophers 
influenced Kezilahabi and how he responds to it.  
After my preliminary description of Kezilahabi’s poetics (Gaudioso 
2013b/2015), the analysis of these ‘responses’ (here transfer and rewriting) are a 
contribution to the hermeneutics of Kezilahabi’s poetics and philosophy and also 
to process of construction of these thought this analysis that concern a strictly 
comparison of texts. In this way we can clarify the influences of Western 
Philosophy on Kezilahabi and his critical receipt and reworking. Further, the texts 
of German philosophers are a source with which to identify transfer and rewriting, 
but due to the different nature of the texts (even assuming – in truth it is not so – 
that we can strictly classify poetry (Kezilahabi) and philosophy (Nietzsche and 
Heidegger)), and are also used as tools to analyse Kezilahabi’s texts. Thus, for 
example, at the beginning of the third section, the concept of solitude is neither a 
transfer nor a rewriting. Through the analysis of Nietzsche’s words and 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche, we are able to discover how the 
metaphoric/allegoric journey is not a simple journey-motif, but a transfer, as it 
involves on one hand, the question of language as an existential-ontological 
category (as in Heidegger of Unterwegs zur Sprache) and on the other hand, the 
question of artistic creation (as in Nietzsche especially in Also sprach 
Zarathustra). 
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2. EDUCATION TO ‘EVIL’2. THE TRANSFERRING OF TONICUM 
 
2.1 A BITTER AESTHETIC MEDICINE FOR BEING 
 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of unmasking is very important in analysing Kezilahabi’s 
poetics, because the German philosopher (and philologer) was the first to 
‘systematically’ start the unmasking of the Western Weltanschauung 
(‘worldview’). The intention of unmasking is clearly expressed in Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral: 
So let us give voice to this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, 
the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined – and so we 
need to know about the conditions and circumstances under which the 
values grew up, developed and changed (morality as result, as symptom, 
as mask, as tartuffery, as sickness, as misunderstanding; but also morality 
as cause, remedy, stimulant, inhibition, poison), since we have neither had 
this knowledge up till now nor even desired it. People have taken the value 
of these ‘values’ as given, as factual, as beyond all questioning; up till now, 
nobody has had the remotest doubt or hesitation in placing higher value on 
‘the good man’ than on ‘the evil’, higher value in the sense of 
advancement, benefit and prosperity for man in general (and this includes 
man’s future). What if the opposite were true? What if a regressive trait 
lurked in ‘the good man’, likewise a danger, an enticement, a poison, a 
narcotic, so that the present lived at the expense of the future? (Nietzsche 
2007: 7–8).3 
 
 
The narcotic is ‘the sleep of consciousness’, which makes us accept passively 
morality, social rules, etc... Nietzsche, as Kezilahabi, opposes to this narcotic the 
tonicum which describes pain. This substitution is undertaken with the aim of 
starting a process of unmasking and liberating. Indeed, the replacement of the 
narcotic with the tonicum proves necessary to search for truth, freedom, and 
essence. In Kezilahabi’s first book of poems, Kichomi (‘Sharp pain’, 1974), pain 
plays a big role. It can be like “a cow in the slaughterhouse”, as in the poem 
Fungueni Mlango (‘Open the door’, 1974: 23): 
 
Lakini mwanadamu hatanifungulia. 
           Damu 
Damu puani, damu mdomoni, 
Damu kichwani itumikayo kama wino. 
Mikono, kichwa, mabega uchovu. 
Kwa kichwa kama cha mbuni 
Mchangani, tena ninaugonga 
But no one opens it for me. 
              Blood 
Blood in the nose, blood in the mouth, 
Blood that is used like ink in the head. 
Hands, head, back, all tired. 
With my head like that of an ostrich 
In the sand, again I bang the door 
                                                 
2  With the term evil we refer here to what scares, hurts and is unknown.  
3  Emphasis in original, except the word in bold. In all other examples, we leave the emphasis 
as in the original version. 
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Lakini mwanadamu hatanifungulia. 
Ninaona kizunguzungu 
Ninapiga kelele kama 
Ng’ombe machinjioni: 
Fungueni mlango! 
Mlango fungueni! 
Lakini mwanadamu hatanifungulia. 
But no one opens it for me. 
I feel dizzy 
I make noise like 
A cow in the slaughterhouse: 
Open the door! 
The door, open it! 
But no one opens it for me. 
(Trans. by Ranne 2006) 
 
Blood is a fundamental element in Kichomi as well as in the whole poetic of 
Kezilahabi, and occurs several times in this book of poems (Ranne 2006; 
Gaudioso 2010/2013a/2015). It cannot be read as an isolated element. Also in the 
novel Nagona (female name, 1990), blood is related obviously to pain, but also to 
memory and writing. Since language and writing are prosthesis and as such, they 
have return (even if they are extroverted and fading) with the aid of pain (which 
is the most powerful aid of mnemonics), to wedge into flesh (Frasca 2005: 38). It 
is not a coincidence if for Nietzsche, too, these elements are related to each other 
(Gaudioso 2013b/2015). Indeed Nietzsche (2006: 27–28) writes: “Of all that is 
written I love only that which one writes with his blood. Write with blood, and 
you will experience that blood is spirit. Whoever writes in blood and proverbs 
does not want to be read, but to be learned by heart.” According to Nietzsche, 
pain, the search for truth and freedom, and creation are strongly related. Pain 
comes from the reconsideration and re-thinking of the instruments of the 
“creator”, in this case language for the writer. It emerges from the words of 
Nietzsche when he says “learned by heart” and also in Kezilahabi when he says 
that he wants to reform the Swahili literary language in order to make it closer to 
everyday language (1974: XIII). This complexity of pain is expressed in the 
kichomi. It is explained in the poem Nimechoka (‘I’m tired’, 1974: 34–35), where 
pain has an awful and dreadful aspect: 
 
Lakini ninaogopa chini yangu naona miti 
Iliyochongwa ikifuata usawa wa waya hii, 
Ikingoja kwa hamu, kama mshikaki 
kunichoma, 
Kunitoboa na kufurahia kimya kimya 
Uzuri wa kupita katika mwili mwororo wa 
binadamu.[…] 
 
[…]Mimi bado nimening’inia na vitimbo 
haviong’oki. 
Lakini pole pole ninaanza kutabasamu. 
Sijafika hatua ya kucheka; maana nimechoka, 
kichomi kimenipata na sijadondoka. 
 
But I’m afraid below me I see sharp 
stakes, that follow the line of wire, 
waiting craving, like a skewer to transfix 
me,  
to pierce me and silence to enjoy 
the beauty to come in tender meat of 
human. 
 
I still dangle and the stakes have not been 
removed, 
but I begin slowly to smile.  
I have not arrived at the point of laughter; 
because I’m tired a sharp pain pervaded 
me and I didn’t fall yet.4 
                                                 
4  My translation; all translations of the examples are mine, unless otherwise indicated. 
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But why this pain? Why the tearing pain? Why the slaughterhouse and the sharp 
stakes? As already mentioned, the title of this collection of poems is Kichomi 
(‘Sharp Pain’). Kichomi comes from ku-choma, which means “1. Pierce, stab 
prick 2. (fig.) pain, hurt, offend” but also “burn, scorch, scald; set on fire” 
(Mohamed 2011: 87). So does this pain come from being burned or being torn? 
In any case we can admit both meanings, as the Swahili language admits the open 
possibilities of poetry. But the words of the poem Nimechoka are really explicit 
in this regard, “miti/[...]ikingoja kwa hamu, mshikaki kunichoma” (‘stakes[...]/ 
waiting craving, like a spit to transfix me’) and “kichomi kimenipata” (‘a sharp 
pain pervaded me’). This type of pain is important not only because it is the title 
of the collection of poems, and not only for the role that it plays in this book, but 
also for the intertextual reference it activates. We should recognise this in order 
to recognise kichomi and mlango as rewritings of Heidegger´s concepts. In the 
introduction to Kichomi, Kezilahabi writes that Fungueni Mlango represents the 
second part of a collection of poems and in this part “especially a question 
troubled me. The question was the meaning of life. This upset really my heart.” 
(Kezilahabi 1974: XV). Thinking about the meaning of life is not a simple act of 
thinking, but the declaration of a poetic and of his affinity to Existentialism. So it 
is not strange if these few elements – like sharp pain, the door, Existentialism, etc. 
– remind us of the essay by Martin Heiddeger Unterwegs zur Sprache (‘On the 
Way to the Language’): 
The threshold is the ground-beam that bears the doorway as a whole. It 
sustains the middle in which the two, the outside and the inside, penetrate 
each other. The threshold bears the between.[…] But what is pain? Pain 
rends. It is the rift. But it does not tear apart into dispersive fragments. Pain 
indeed tears asunder, it separates, yet so that at the same time it draws 
everything to itself, gathers it to itself. Its rending, as a separating that 
gathers, is at the same time that drawing which, like the pen drawing of a 
plan or sketch, draws and joins together what is held apart in separation. 
Pain is the joining agent in the rending that divides and gathers. Pain is the 
joining of the rift. The joining is the threshold. It settles the between, the 
middle of the two that are separated in it. Pain joins the rift of the 
difference. Pain is the dif-ference itself. (Heidegger 2007: 26–27). 
 
Pain as the fundamental element of existence and the centrality of life’s 
experience were prominent literary themes during the second half of the twentieth 
century. It is the writing itself which tends to be life’s experience (Barthes, 1982; 
Fusillo, 2006/2009; Perniola, 1995). This means that the poetic of Kezilihabi has 
an affinity with the poetics of the greatest writers of the last fifty years, like Pier 
Paolo Pasolini, Jean Genet or Ingeborg Bachmann. In these poetics the role played 
by Existentialism (in this case Heidegger) and by Nietzsche is fundamental and 
that is why Kezilahabi constantly refers to these philosophers. In all his works the 
comparison with Heidegger allows an outlining of his philosophy. In fact the 
terminus kichomi is a rewriting of pain, which is described by Heidegger as what 
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‘divides’ and ‘joins’. That is the same for a skewer, “like a skewer to transfix me,/ 
to pierce me”, the pierced meat is divided, but also joined. The word mlango 
(‘door’) in the poem Fungueni Mlango represents the threshold of existence, 
which Heidegger treated. In this sense mlango represents the rewriting of Unter-
Schied (‘Dif-ference’), which is the space in the rift where the Unter-Schied 
“bears”. In this poem the lyric ‘I’ does not complain about pain and solitude, but 
desires them; as the scream at the end of the poem calls upon death, it is a scream 
of death (Gaudioso R. 2010a, 2013b/2015). Pain is called upon to be the search 
for truth and existence. These rewritings kichomi and mlango are adaptations to 
the Swahili code. This pain, kichomi, that is central to the collection of poems 
Kichomi, is the tonicum and kichomi itself is a tonicum.5 The search for truth and 
existence needs this tonicum.  
 
 
2.2 DEATH: EXISTENCE AND RE-GENERATION 
 
In the poem Karibu Ndani (‘Welcome’1988: 37), in the second collection of 
poems Karibu Ndani (1988), pain also has a regenerative value: 
 
Huu ndio mdundo wenyewe, ngoma ya watu 
wazima 
Ai! Nani atalishikilia jua! usiku mmoja 
hautoshi! 
Ai! Nipigieni makofi, nivunje yangu mifupa! 
Ai! Mimi mmeza nyoka, kisha nyuma 
akatokea! 
This is drumbeat itself, the dance of upright 
humans 
Ah! Who will grab the sun! A night isn’t 
enough!  
Ah! Clap-slap me to break my bones! 
Ah! I’m the one who gulps the snake, he’ll 
come out from my back! 
 
Here the lyric ‘I’ calls upon pain “to break my bones”. He is pierced again by 
something, but this time it’s something alive, a snake. The pain is necessary to 
regenerate and it can cause death, like the pain that comes from being pierced by 
a stake or all bones being broken. This death as a symbol in literature has a 
regenerative value, like the end of the novel Nagona (1990), where almost all 
humans die, but life continues, and in the last chapter Nagona6 smiles announcing 
a new or rising humanity. At the same time, in the poem Kisima (‘The Well’, 
2008: 25) in the collection of poems Karibu Ndani (‘Welcome’, 1988), Kezilahabi 
                                                 
5  Kichomi as a collection of poems itself is also a tonicum for Swahili poetry (Gaudioso 
2010a, 2013b), because Kezilahabi is not the first to write in Swahili free-verse. The first 
collection of poems is by Kulikoyela Kahigi and Mugyabuso Mulokozi (1973), but poetry, 
especially in Kichomi, is more revolutionary by reason of his poetic of everyday dialogue and 
his bitter verses. Elena Zubkovà Bertoncini shares this view (in Mulokozi, 2013). 
6  She is the central figure in the collection of poems Karibu Ndani and in the homonym 
novel, where the protagonist is continuously seeking for her. 
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urges us to conceive the death of the legendary Swahili hero Liyongo Fumo7 as 
something generative. Death regenerates existence and also generates a new form 
of relation with the world, a new Weltanschauung. In the third collection of poems 
Dhifa (‘The Banquet’, 2008) death is very much present and almost at the centre 
of this collection (Gaudioso 2013b/Gaudioso 2015). Death is the beginning and 
the end of everything. This is shown in the following example taken from 
Mahojano na Kifo (‘The Dialogue with the Death’, 2008: 42): 
 
 
Mshairi: Wewe [Kifo] ni Alpha na Omega 
               Sema kama hii 
               Ndiyo maana? 
Poet: You [Death] are Alpha and Omega 
          say if  
          is it the meaning itself? 
 
If, in the third collection of poems, death is for the lyric ‘I’ something familiar, 
with which to speak, in the first two collections of poems, death is disquieting. 
Part of this tonicum is eeriness, better conveyed by the German word unheimlich.  
The word unheimlich expresses eeriness and the origin of this eeriness. The 
German word is un- (not) -heim- (home) lich (adjectival suffix), that which gives 
a feeling of estrangement, the opposite of familiar. Sigmund Freud analysed this 
feeling in an essay (1991) about a short story by E.T.A. Hoffmann, Der Sandmann 
(‘The Sandman’, 18168). Das Unheimliche (eeriness or the uncanny) for Freud is 
caused by something that is perceived to be both familiar yet alien at the same 
time, which causes a feeling of being uncomfortably strange. The uncanny comes 
from of something that is repressed, so it was familiar, but through repulsion 
process goes in the sphere of uncanny. That often creates a cognitive dissonance 
within the experiencing subject, due to the paradoxical nature of being 
simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by an object. According to Freud, for 
something to be unheimlich it was familiar. Therefore, what is in Heim, the 
heimlich is “near” ourselves, instead the unheimlich emerges with its potential 
eeriness in order to approach to something that we think that we not know yet. 
Thus, this feeling of eeriness is functional to start a knowing/understanding 
process, to approach what is not already “near”. 
We can use the same elements to analyse the poetry of Kezilahabi in Fungueni 
Mlango (‘Open the Door’, 1974). This poem is pervaded by a feeling of 
unheimlich. From the beginning the lyric ‘I’ is in a room without windows and in 
front of him there is a door of paper. These elements are both heimlich (the lyric 
‘I’ is in a room in a house) and unheimlich (the paper door and the room without 
windows are uncanny). The unheimlich increases, like in a nightmare, the door 
“unatoa mlio kilio” (lets out a sinister groan), blood gushes, the tiredness, blood 
used like ink, the lyric ‘I’ has vertigo, he feels dizzy and he emits a groan of death 
(1974: 23): 
                                                 
7  Fumo Liyongo lived in an undefined period between the 9th and 13th centuries. He is 
celebrated as a hero, warrior and poet in traditional Swahili poems, stories and songs. Liyongo 
himself is credited with many such songs and poems. 
8  First published in the collection Nachtstücke (‘Night Pieces’) 1817. 
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Ninapiga kelele kama 
ng’ombe machinjioni 
fungueni mlango! 
Mlango fungueni! 
Lakini mwanadamu hatanifungulia. 
I shout like  
a cow in a slaughterhouse 
open the door! 
The door, open it! 
But nobody will open it for me.9 
 
 
3. REWRITING IDENTITY, HOMELESSNESS AND FREEDOM 
 
3.1 HOMELESSNESS AND FREEDOM 
 
Solitude is an emergent theme in the above-quoted poem, Fungueni Mlango. 
Indeed, as Kezilahabi maintains: “Hewa kunikosa/na jasho kunitoka ndani ya 
chumba/kwa upweke/ninajiona nimefungiwa.”(‘I’m out of breath/and I sweat in 
the room/for solitude/I feel confined’, 1974: 23). This solitude is also a tonicum 
and it is called upon, desired as such, because it is “On the Way of the Creator”, 
as Nietzsche says: 
The voice of the herd will still resonate in you too. And when you will say 
“I no longer am of one conscience with you,” then it will be a lament and 
a pain. [...] It is terrible to be alone with the judge and avenger of one’s 
own law. Thus does a star get thrown out into desolate space and into the 
icy breath of solitary being. (Nietzsche 2006: 46) 
 
 
Solitude is felt at the beginning of the journey in search of truth, and for 
Kezilahabi, as for Nietzsche, this is the duty of the writer (Kezilahabi 1974: 14). 
In this sense, solitude is a pain, and as such it is also a tonicum, but at the same 
time it is called upon, it is willed, because the path of creation and of the search 
for truth crosses solitude – and in this sense solitude itself is the necessary 
tonicum. Heidegger´s lectures on Friedrich Nietzsche and Friedrich Hölderlin, 
collected in the essay Einleitung in die Philosophie: Denken und Dichten, 
influenced not only the ontological and existential conception of Kezilahabi, but 
also his aesthetics. They extensively explain the double feeling of attraction and 
repulsion in relation to solitude and the Heimat.10  
We call the circumference that is historically enclosed [umhegten] and 
nourishing [hegenden], that fuels all courage and releases all capacities, 
                                                 
9  Elsewhere (Gaudioso 2008; 2010a; 2013a; 2013b) we have translated into Italian the last 
verse, which occurs three times in the poem, as “Ma terra e sangue l’uomo, non m’aprirà” 
(‘But earth and blood the human, he’ll not open for me’). Mwanadamu means human, but we 
used the etymological sense of Adam and translated “terra e sangue l’uomo”, because of the 
repetition of the word damu (‘blood’) in the preceding lines and due to the importance of the 
blood in this poem, as also in the collection Kichomi (Gaudioso 2010a; 2013a; 2013b; Ranne 
2006) and in other works like Nagona (Gaudioso 2010a; 2013a; 2013b). 
10  Similarly, as explained in the first paragraph, Freud describes this double feeling of 
attraction and repulsion in relation to unheimlich. 
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that surrounds the place where humans belong in the essential meaning of 
a claimed listening: the home [die Heimat]. The birthplace and the region 
of the country of birth are only the hearth of the home if they are already 
pervaded by the liberated native [heimatlichen] essence; [and if,] insofar 
as they are, they therefore give the gifts [Geben] of the home that the 
modern human – only barely, or rarely, or too late – recognizes and tends 
as such. Having become God-less and world-less, the modern human is 
home-less. Indeed, in the absence [Ausbleiben] of the God and the ruin of 
the world, homelessness is especially expected of the modern historical 
human. [...] For this reason, each of the titles applies just as well as the 
others, such as the one called “Without Home” or another called “The Free 
Spirit.” To be sure, homelessness is poetized in the poem, yet someone is 
not merely lamenting the loss of the home; here someone is speaking who 
at the same time finds the way in the “winter-journey” “toward cold skies.” 
The person does not look back and no longer flees from the “winter” into 
the previous world, which he has completely lost and conceded in order to 
turn his “spirit” out into the “open”. (Heidegger 2011: 24–27).  
 
Thus, the experiences of solitude, of Unheimlichkeit and of the feeling of being 
homeless (heimatlos) are tonicum (pain, torment) and at the same time are wished 
for, because they are necessary to the processes of searching for truth, creativity 
and liberation. Kezilahabi himself, in agreement with Heidegger, writes “the 
essence of truth is freedom” (1985: 67). Indeed, the motif of journey is not only a 
motif of world-literature, but, as this comparative analysis shows, a transfer. That 
is why it is related with tonicum, the search for truth and aesthetic creation (as for 
Nietzsche) and with the existential-ontological question of language (as for 
Heidegger). This is shown in the poem Safari (Journey 1988: 7): 
Wakati nisafiripo kwenda mawioni usiku 
Nitazichuma karanga zote zing’aazo angani 
Na kuziweka ndani ya mifuko iliyotuna. 
Nitakapofika nitafungua kinywa kwa chapatti 
Ya dhahabu kabla haijapoa kolimani; 
Halafu hapatakuwa na mwanga tena, 
Kwani taswira na sitiari zote za nuru 
Hazikutufikisha pasipo giza. 
Kwa hiyo basi kama mkulima kupofu 
Nitapanda mbegu gizani.11 
 
                                                 
11  The time of my journey goes from dawn towards night/I’ll collect all nuts that shine in the 
sky/and put them in my pockets./When I arrive I open my mouth for the golden/chapati before 
it cools on the hill./Then there is no more light,/because all imaginings and metaphors of 
light/didn’t bring us to where there is no darkness./ Therefore, as a blind farmer/ I’ll sow into 
the dark. 
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The journey – which obviously has a metaphoric meaning – is necessary for these 
processes. The poem Namagondo II12 in the second collection of poems, Karibu 
Ndani (‘Welcome’, 1988), contains the line “Nimekuwa mgeni kijijini 
nilikozaliwa” (‘I have become a stranger in the village of my birth’). We can use 
the same words that Heidegger writes about Nietzsche to comment on 
Kezilahabi’s poem: homelessness as expressed here is not merely lamenting the 
loss of the home, here the lyric ‘I’ finds the way in the “winter-journey” towards 
the freedom of spirit. In Namagondo we read: “Yasikieni ya wataalam kwenu 
walioletwa/sahauni, ule wimbo wa zamani. Zingatieni ya mbolea na ujamaa 
vijijini”13 (Listen to the experts who were brought to you./Forget that old 
song./Consider matters of fertilizer, of socialism in the villages).14 Here, the poet 
can – still with irony – show a way, while in Namagondo II he “has become a 
stranger”, or, in the last stanza “Miaka yote ya uhuru imeleta nini Namagondo!”15 
(‘What have all these years of independence brought, Namagondo?!’). Thus, the 
journey, the “winter-journey”, must be undertaken, because the Heimat is 
compromised. Indeed, there is the same feeling in the poem Azimo (‘Declaration’, 
1988: 27), which is related to the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the constitutive 
socialist proposal. Kezilahabi’s poem expresses the fall of the utopia of socialism 
of the first Prime Minister and hero of Tanzanian independence, Julius Nyerere: 
 
Kilichosalia sasa 
ni punje za ulezi 
zilizosambazwa jangwani 
na mpandaji kipofu. 
What remains now 
are the grains of finger millet 
spread in the desert 
by a blind sower. 
  
What Kezilahabi expresses in these two poems is related to nostalgia and to 
Heimweh (homesickness), but also to Heidegger’s “Without Home – that does not 
here mean that mere lack of home, but rather the loss of the previous one in 
anticipation of, and searching for, the new one” (2011: 27). Moreover, in the poem 
Dhamiri yangu (‘My conscience’, 1974: 36) we read: “Lakini lazima nitamke kwa 
nguvu/hapa nilipo sina uhuru” (‘But I have to pronounce with power:/Here where 
I stay I haven’t freedom.’); if, as Kezilahabi writes in his PhD thesis (1985: 67), 
truth and freedom are strongly related, we have another reason to feel homeless 
and to undertake the journey. Here it is clearly a process of interpretation and 
influence. Therefore we consider that the elements of homelessness and the 
journey are transferred from the philologist-philosopher-poet Nietzsche to the 
poetry of Kezilahabi via the interpretation of the ontological-existentialist 
philosopher Martin Heidegger.  
 
 
                                                 
12  Namagondo is the village on Ukerewe Island where Kezilahabi was born.  
13  Kezilahabi 1974: 68. 
14  Translation by Annmarie S. Drury (2013). 
15  Kezilahabi 1988: 39. 
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3.2 TRADITIONS, IDENTITY, WORLD-VIEW AND FREEDOM 
 
In this sense, in the conclusion to his thesis, Kezilahabi (1985: 357–358) clearly 
unmasks the “Errata or a Tragedy of Errors”: 
Africa has been plagued with philosophies of origin. In the Western world 
this very philosophy culminated in Nazi Germany, and we know the 
consequences of this philosophy. The oldest is not necessarity the nearest 
to our true Being, neither does it have a mandate to rule the present. It does 
not greatly matter whether we are the real true heirs to the "Stolen legacy". 
What matters is what we are. A philosophy of origins is a Fascist 
enterprise. Philosophies of origins are another error. The third error 
concerns moralism. We have, in the past, put too much emphasis on 
moralism and spiritualism. [...] There is no causa prima for Africanness 
and blackness. Since no one is responsible for our Being African and Black 
no moral facts can be attached to these questions. [...] We have noted that 
through the glorification of illusory traditional qualities of African society, 
our leaders create mythologies of a magnificent past and refuse to confront 
those very institutions which are by their nature retrogressive. 
 
Kezilahabi does not despise origin or culture, but he is against their maintenance 
and their political retrogressive use. Moreover, it also influences his aesthetics. In 
his article Ushairi na nyimbo katika Utamaduni wetu (‘Poety and song in our 
culture’, 1981), part of a book about the heritage of Tanzanian culture, he claims: 
Tradition doesn't stop. Changes happen from generation to generation. 
They are those who are crying for the past which in reality will not return. 
[…] The important question we need to ask ourselves is what changes and 
to where. But we can't go back and we can't stop changes because what is 
unchangeable is dead. (Kezilahabi 1981: 137). 
 
Kezilahabi encourages people to accept the changes, but also he himself is a 
producer of changes. That is the goal of re-thinking and reconsidering all social 
agreements. The poem Wimbo wa Unyago (‘The Song of Unyago’) in the third 
collection of poems Dhifa (‘Banquet’, 2008) is a product of this type and as such 
it ‘naturally’ pushes the reader to liberation, that is responsibility and freedom. 
This poem tries to combine tradition with progress and this is visible in the title. 
The term unyago refers to rituals and practices associated with the transition to 
adulthood of girls, in which older women teach young ones the rules and practices 
that will lead them to have a healthy and moral sex life during marriage and the 
rules connected with wedding rites. In this poem the poet pushes young people to 
live their life, because older people have already lived their life, and even warns 
women to live in freedom and with responsibility. The poet urges young people 
to live their life and their time (2008: 17): 
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Ishi kijana ishi, ishi maisha yako 
Wazee waliishi yao 
Sasa yamebaki kwako. 
Ukabila ni utumwa 
Olewa msichana olewa 
Olewa chaguo lako 
Hiari ni haki asilia 
Achaguaye embe bichi 
Ajua lini litaiva. 
Live young people live, live your life 
Old people lived theirs, 
Now yours remain 
Tribalism is slavery 
Marry young girl marry 
Marry your choice 
Choice is your natural right 
The one who chooses an unripe mango 
knows when it will ripen. 
 
In the last stanza he warns the women not to conceive too many children and to 
worry about their health. If we think that unyago is a traditional practice, we can 
understand what Kezilahabi means when he says that culture and customs don’t 
stand still, they change constantly. That is good because what doesn’t change is 
dead. The element of innovation comes from the requirement of liberating. It’s 
not a coincidence that in the Song of Unyago Kezilahabi urges women to feel 
more free and to be responsible for themselves. According to Kezilahabi (1985), 
the Weltanschauung of Africans has to be liberating. If Africans have to liberate 
themselves from the primacy of morality and ethnicity, they also have to liberate 
themselves from a Western Weltanschauung (1985: 114, 169, 179, 358). That is 
the theme of the poem Kumbe16 (1974: 37) in the collection Kichomi (‘Sharp 
pain’, 1974): 
 
Kwamba elimu walotupa wale wakoloni 
 
kama suruali iliyopasuka matakoni, 
kweli kama ng’ombe waliostushwa 
na siafu, tumetambua dhahiri. 
 
Aaa! Kumbe ndoo maana wazee 
tulipokuwa tukitembea na vitabu 
mabarabarani kwa huruma walitucheka 
Lo! Lo! Lo! Tulikuwa tukichezewa! 
Education that was given to us by those 
colonialists 
Like a trouser which has burst at the buttocks 
Really, like cows that were scared 
and ants, we have understood the truth. 
 
Aaa! that's why old people 
when we walked with books 
on the road, with pity they laughed at us 
duh duh duh we were being played. 
 
However, Kezilahabi proposes a broad liberation; the African mind must be 
decolonised. The fundamental aspect of liberation from the Western 
Weltanschauung (world-view) is to reconsider the primary role of knowledge. 
The new knowing in the poem Kisima (‘The Well’ 1988: 25) is related to this 
reconsideration: 
  
                                                 
16  Kumbe: “(1) an expletive used to express surprise over pleasant or unpleasant things 
happening in reverse of what was expected or thought, (2) a word expressing the contrariness 
of things or situations; whereas, while, on the contrary.” (Mohamed 2011: 382). 
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Pandikizi la mtu 
kwa hatua ndefu litembealo  
na sidano ya shamba kitovuni [...] 
Aliyeitia kitovuni kwa hofu 
ingawa tegemeo hakulipata 
alifunga mlango uelekeao 
katikati ya ujuzi na urazini mpya 
mwanzo wa kizazi tukionacho. 
The giant 
walking with long steps  
with a copper dagger in his navel[...]  
Who pierced it in his navel for fear  
even though support was not given  
he opened the door toward  
between wisdom and new ratio 
the first offspring that we see. 
 
The revolution here suggested by Kezilahabi through the figure of giant Liyongo 
Fumo and his death, as mentioned before, is radical and has the same value as the 
Oedipus myth. Oedipus kills his father and starts travelling, he runs away chased 
by the Erynis. Finally, he will be judged in Athens by a court, in which the goddess 
of wisdom, Athena, will also take part. This civil court excludes the vindictive 
Erynis, goddesses of the ancestral terror of human beings, and establishes the 
supremacy of logos. In a Freudian reading, the Erynis, and everything which 
represents the ‘animal’ element of human beings, is removed, hidden and ready 
to emerge at any time. The revolution of Kezilahabi aims to break the inner 
human/animal dichotomy and to recover a more direct way to relate man to nature 
and to the world, where knowledge is not an object. It is a new Humanism, where 
human perception is shaped as something “in between the wisdom and the new 
ratio”, that is intuition as a form of knowledge.  
How do the farmer, the fisherman, etc. know it is time to change their style 
of response? – through listening to the tune of the cosmos and through 
intuition. Listening to the silent language of the fourfold world is speaking. 
Farmers, fishermen, etc. speak silently as they respond and yield 
themselves to the call of Being, and as language discloses itself from 
concealment and speaks to Being. Intuition rather than intellect is the main 
phenomenon of passage. Thus a cold breeze of a special king will 
communicate to the farmer’s face and body, and he will respond 
intuitively. (Kezilahabi 1985: 241) 
 
Oedipus’s journey, as for the lyric self in Karibu Ndani and Nagona, is necessary 
to re-establish a new Heimat, and as a tonicum “makes the logos accessible to 
understanding” (1985: 272). The concept of home, however, has more values. 
Heimat for Kezilahabi is his native village Namagondo, but it also has a 
metaphorical value. In fact, the poem itself is configured as the house of the poet 
(1974: XIII). Therefore, there is another reason to make a journey: if poetry is the 
home of the writer, he should undertake the journey, because “kwani taswira na 
sitiari zote za nuru/hazikutufikisha pasipo giza.” (Kezilahabi 1988: 7) (‘Because 
symbols and metaphors of light/ didn’t drive us where there is not darkness.’). In 
this sense the importance of language must be understood in Kezilahabi’s poetic. 
Even language has to be liberated – and in this sense Kezilahabi’s thought is 
shown in all its universal flow – from the dogmatic division between subject and 
object. This has been extensively explained by Alena Rettovà (2004: 54): 
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“Now, I think we should found a new language,” I voiced a thought. 
“Me too, I have been thinking of this. We will need a language that does 
not contain the issue of Man and Thing.” 
 
“This language should also not contain words like ‘nuclear’ and ‘war’. We 
shall create a language whose foundation is being.” (Kezilahabi 1991: 69) 
[...] Fortunately, Kezilahabi’s dissertation offers clues to these questions. 
Kezilahabi’s project of “onto-criticism” seeks to “avoid the tragic 
epistemology of Western man” (Kezilahabi 1985: 219) and go beyond “the 
categories of Subject/Object” (Kezilahabi 1985: 215) in understanding the 
“ontological aspect of metaphor, symbol and ritual” (Kezilahabi 1985: 
215). This is the task of onto-criticism, which Kezilahabi opposes to 
techno-criticism, as an external, objectifying attitude to literature and art.17 
 
In this way a homeland is given back to language, that is, the language returns to 
have its ground, creative and adamitic value. It seems like an echo of the German 
philosopher Johann Georg Hamann, whose work was used by his student J. G. 
Herder as a main support of the Sturm und Drang movement, and his thinking is 
considered as Counter-Enlightenment. Hamann (2002: 2) stated that “Poetry is 
the mother-tongue of the human race; even as the garden is older than the 
ploughed field, painting than script; as song is more ancient than declamation; 
parables older than reasoning; barter than trade.” In this sense the philosophy of 
Kezilahabi carries out a liberation and re-evaluation of what is “repressed”, 
removed, in order to let the regenerative, creative and “projective” elements of 
essence emerge.  
An onto-critic extends the domain of understanding beyond objectification 
and identifies language with Being. The onto-critic in engaged in the 
liberation of the words from convention, and seeks to displace and decenter 
logocentrism and signification by making relations empty of meaning and 
by dismantling the resemblance of language to the world. Because the 
economic and political situations in Africa are fundamental to our future 
destiny, the onto-critic has to retain the idea of literature as a form of 
consciousness. The onto-critic therefore rejects theories of uniqueness to 
literature and the reduction of it to a moral endeavor. To an onto-critic, 
therefore, literature is not a reorganization of impulses but an ontological 
understanding that is projective. (Kezilahabi 1985: 217–218).  
 
That is the new Heimat, the meaning of research, the wished Heimat (Heidegger, 
2011: 27), where language is no longer alienated from reality and action18: 
Ninapotea katika bahari ya ndoto/ndani ya msitu uliofungama/ambamo kufikiri 
                                                 
17  The quoted translation by Mzingile (Kezilahabi 1991) is by Rettovà. 
18  We have already focused on Kezilahabi’s “utopia” of language (Gaudioso 2010a, 2013b), 
in the latter by a comparison with the essay by Roland Barthes, Le degré zéro de l'écriture 
(1953). 
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bila vitendo ni kuwa msaliti (Kezilahabi 1988: 15) (‘I am lost in the sea of 
dreams/inside the thick forest/where to think without actions is to be a traitor’).  
 
 
4. TO BE IN TIME, OR RATHER BECOMING-BETWEEN. 
REWRITING BEING AND TIME 
 
4.1 THE ETERNAL RETURN AND THE OVER-HUMAN 
 
Panta rei, all flows, all changes and lives. Existence is changingness, thus time 
emerges as a fundamental element. Indeed, time is central to Kezilahabi’s 
thinking. He considers that nothing happens out of it, time and existence are 
closely linked. Time links ‘being’ and ‘becoming’, because what will be is already 
in nuce, that is its potential future. 
It can be stated generally that existential time, in the African context, does 
not separate “being” from “becoming”. Here “being” is defined as social 
reality resulting from socio-historical practices and revealed from 
concealment by the human condition as truth. In short “being” is that which 
reveals itself in the context of truth. “Becoming” will be understood as a 
process and state of existential change in the very essence of beings. Time 
is the horizon in which being and becoming take place. [...] Since 
Becoming involves change, it is Becoming that gives the idea of motion 
and therefore the idea of potential future. The future is not separable from 
being, and for this reason nothing can become without being and vice 
versa. (Kezilahabi 1985: 124–125). 
 
In his PhD thesis Kezilahabi questions himself about time, in order to overcome 
the conception of linear or circular time. Time is not circular, because he states 
that in being there is already a potential future, that is not a return to the past. At 
the same time it is not a linear conception, because the future is inscribed in the 
present, in being. Indeed in his thesis he writes: 
Through constant Being and Becoming the self returns to its innermost self 
and gathers the totality of Being with the fourfold world to create a sense 
of belonging together in “the eternal recurrence of the same” which 
manifests itself in the cyclical time of annual and seasonal ceremonies, and 
in rituals of Becoming. [...] Rites of passage are a temporalizing of the 
unity of time in the eternal now. (Kezilahabi1985: 240–245). 
 
An individual history in its social context shows itself as a cyclical recurrence of 
events. It is the focus of these verses of the poem Nondo (‘Mot’h, 1988: 13) in the 
collection of poems Karibu Ndani (‘Welcome’, 1988): 
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Nje kuna giza na upepo unaimba 
wimbo wa upweke na woga. [...] 
Moyo unaanza haraka kupiga ngoma 
na kalamu yangu yaparaza karatasi 
nao miguu isojunga yagongagonga sakafu. 
 
Sekunde zawa miaka na dakika karne. 
Nacheza historia yangu mwenyewe. 
 
Outside there's darkness and wind sings 
the song of loneliness and fear. [...] 
The heart begins to drum fast 
and my pen grazes the paper 
and my legs parallel to each other hit the 
floor. 
Seconds become years and minutes decades. 
I am playing my own history. 
 
Again, the solitude and fear (at least as pain that arises from the anticipation of 
evil19) are pain. Thus, they are a tonicum, which the lyric ‘I’ needs, in this case in 
order to play “my own history”. That is related to the conception of time as a 
“spiral of anyone” (Kezilahabi 1985: 282–283), which recaps in itself the 
conceptions of circular time and linear time. Therefore, cyclic time not only holds 
these events, but also it is celebrated by them and in them finds its own essence. 
The eternal now is an affirmation not only of life but of Being itself. It is 
ekstasis that rescues thinking from the onslaught of theoria and liberates 
language from grammar. This intensified emotional rapture is not therefore 
expressible in normal language. It is a kind of metalanguage, an assertive 
power of the self-encapsulated in ritual, music, magic and poetry – a 
moment in depth. [...] Ritual, music, magic and poetry are the four 
elements of African culture through which the eternal now is realized. 
(Kezilahabi 1985: 126–127). 
 
We should remember, as we said in the first part of this article, that the tonicum 
is a characteristic element of ritual. In this case the poem Karibu Ndani, quoted 
in the first paragraph, seems to be a recap all these elements: the tonicum and 
cyclical time. But in the perspective of this article it is very important for another 
reason: the snake in the poem Karibu Ndani (‘Welcome’, 1988) quoted in first 
paragraph, has metaphoric/allegoric values, and is a rewriting of the parable-
dream of Zarathustra about a shepherd and a snake in Nietzsche.  
And truly, I saw something the like of which I had never seen before. A 
young shepherd I saw; writhing, choking, twitching, his face distorted, 
with a thick black snake hanging from his mouth. [...] My hand tore at the 
snake and tore – in vain! It could not tear the snake from his throat. Then 
it cried out of me: “Bite down! Bite down! Bite off the head! Bite down!” 
– Thus it cried out of me, my dread, my hatred, my nausea, my pity, all my 
good and bad cried out of me with one shout. [...] Meanwhile the shepherd 
bit down as my shout advised him; he bit with a good bite! Far away he 
spat the head of the snake – and he leaped to his feet. – No longer shepherd, 
no longer human – a transformed, illuminated, laughing being! Never yet 
on earth had I heard a human being laugh as he laughed! (Nietzsche 2006: 
127). 
                                                 
19  Aristotele: “Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of 
an imminent evil”. (1926: 201). 
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This parable-dream of Zarathustra is very important in Nietzsche`s philosophy in 
order to describe fundamental concepts like Ewige Wiederkunft (‘Eternal Return’) 
and Übermensch (‘Overhuman’). We questioned the difference between the fate 
of the snake in Nietzsche and Kezilahabi. We thought that, if in Kezilahabi the 
snake penetrates into the body of man and goes out of his back and both survive, 
it depends on a more “peaceful” relationship between human beings and nature 
and between human beings and God (Gaudioso 2013b, 2015). Indeed Kezilahabi 
writes in his thesis about elements in which the eternal now is realized, elements 
that “impose an illusion on man and reality and appearance become inseparable.” 
(1985: 126). Upon interviews in Ukerewe (August 2014), it came out that 
according to the Wakerewe,20 the big snake, the Python, is God. They cannot kill 
the Python and it is taboo to look at the body of a dead Python. If anyone kills the 
Python, he must name his child after the name of the Python in Kikerewe, the 
language of the Wakerewe, otherwise his child will die. Indeed, understanding the 
rewriting and adaptation from the Ukerewe culture or metaphor of the snake 
makes the results more clear. But there are other elements of rewriting from Also 
Sprach Zarathustra. We asked the same people about the meaning of the name 
“Nagona” in Kikerewe. From the interviews it was recorded that the name means 
that she is everywhere and everything comes by her, because she accepts 
everything, the good and the evil. Nagona and the Übermensch (Overhuman) 
accept both the good and the evil that come from life. They can accept that even 
a worst pain always returns and is the same forever, so they accept the Ewige 
Wiederkunft (‘Eternal Return’). The acceptance of it is a sign of Wille zur Macht 
(‘Will to Power’), which means to accept and to will the continual becoming 
(Kezilahabi 1985: 424) (Gaudioso 2015). It ousts every half will in order to 
liberate the will from everything chained to it and to make the repetition the object 
itself of will. In this case, differently from the narcoticum, accepting everything 
after the experience of tonicum is not the ‘sleep of consciousness’, but rather 
having access to a ‘superior’ one. 
Pain is also a joy, a curse is also a blessing, night is also a sun – go away 
or else you will learn: a wise man is also a fool. Have you ever said Yes to 
one joy? Oh my friends, then you also said Yes to all pain. All things are 
enchained, entwined, enamored – if you ever wanted one time two times, 
if you ever said “I like you, happiness! Whoosh! Moment!” then you 
wanted everything back! – Everything anew, everything eternal, 
everything enchained, entwined, enamored, oh thus you loved the world – 
you eternal ones, love it eternally and for all time; and say to pain also: 
refrain, but come back! For all joy wants – eternity! (Nietzsche 2006:263). 
 
In order to access this awareness, the question of time is fundamental, as we saw 
above; that is because both Kezilahabi and Nietzsche are characterised by 
                                                 
20  Wakerewe means ‘the people from Ukerewe’. I would like to thank the people who agreed 
to speak with me (Valentini Msironga, Edimundi Makaronga, Deusidedit Mussleki Makene na 
Ayubu Luhasile Mutobe) and for great help from Gaudensia Emanuel and Richard Tumaini. 
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expectations. In this sense Nagona as an adaption of both culture and language 
code is a rewriting of the Übermensch.  
 
 
4.2 BEING TIME 
 
Kezilahabi considers that time is the measure of life and there is nothing which 
can be outside of it. Time has its own rhythm. For an African this rhythm comes 
with the foundation of humanity and relations with those who have passed. This 
rhythm is in the outlook of time in Existentialism (2006: 164–168). This centrality 
of time we can find in all the poetic production of Kezilahabi (Gaudioso 
2013b/2015). In the first collection of poems Kichomi (‘Sharp Pain’, 1974), in the 
poem Upepo wa Wakati (‘The Wind of Time’, 1974: 4), he writes “Hivyo ndivyo 
ulimwengu ulivyo./ Na hivyo maisha ya binadamu./ Wanapanda na 
kushuka/wakisukumwa na upepo wa wakati.” (‘Exactly like this is our world./ 
And the life of human beings./They raise and lower/Pushed by the winds of 
time.’).21 Also in the second collection of poems Karibu Ndani (‘Welcome’, 
1988), in the poem Kuishi (‘To live’, 1988: 9): “Kulikuwa na wakati tulikuwa/sasa 
mcheko wajaza utupu wa/pale tulipokuwa.[...]//Tusemalo halisikiki, 
isipokuwa/kulikuwa na wakati tulikuwa.” (‘There was time when we were/But 
now laughter fills the void/of where we were.[...]//What we say is not heard, 
although /there was a time when we were. ’) . And in the third collection of poems 
Dhifa (‘Banquet’, 2008), in the poem Wazo nje ya Wakati (‘A thought out of 
Time’, 2008: 25): “Kifo/ ni wazo nje ya wakati.” (‘Death/ is an idea out of time’). 
In the same collection Kezilahabi (2008: 25) writes wakati (‘time’) as wa-kati that 
is a rewriting of the concept of Heidegger Mitda-sein (Being-there-with). 
The Mitda-sein of others is disclosed only within the world for a Da-sein 
and thus also for those who are Mitda-sein, because Da-sein in itself is 
essentially being-with. The phenomenological statement that Da-sein itself 
is essentially being-with has an existential-ontological meaning. [...] 
Being-with is an attribute of one’s own Da-sein. Mitda-sein characterizes 
the Da-sein of others in that it is freed for a being-with by the world of that 
being-with. Only because it has the essential structure of being-with, is 
one’s own Da-sein Mitda-sein as encounterable by others. (Heidegger 
1996: 113). 
 
Wa-kati is be-between, that is a rewriting of Heidegger´s concepts Unter-Schied 
and Mitda-sein. Unterschied means difference, but as Heidegger writes in 
Unterwegs zur Sprache Unter-Schied – unter- (‘between, under’) Schied 
(‘detachment, rift’) – is the space between the rift, but also under the rift, where 
the rift “bears”. Kati in Swahili means between and wa is to be, wa-kati is a 
rewriting of Unter-Schied, but in the Kezilahabian term, as the author explains 
                                                 
21  Translation by Ranne 2006: 113. 
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(2008: 25), there is not a separation, but a continuous movement of Being. We 
have already recognized mlango (‘door’) as a rewriting of Unter-Schied (dif-
ference), but that doesn´t exclude other rewritings from the same author. The two 
poems where we can read these rewritings were composed thirty years apart. 
Moreover, in Dhifa (‘Banquet’, 2008) we find mlango related to existence (2008: 
58). Wa-kati is also a rewriting of Mitda-sein, because existential-ontological wa-
kati shows the union and the movement of Being, being in changingness. Indeed, 
to borrow the words of Nietzsche (2006: 263), it refers to “everything anew, 
everything eternal, everything enchained, entwined, enamored, oh thus you loved 
the world”. This enchainedness, entwinedness and enamoredness of things is 
expressed by wa-kati in the axis of time (the unity of be and becoming) or of 
existence (the unity of essence and existence). In wa-kati there is the solution that 
Kezilahabi proposes about the circularity or linearity of time like a spiral (1985: 
280–284) and also the overcoming of the separation of subject/object. The same 
elements are expressed in the poem Muungano (Union, 2008: 56), where 
Kezilahabi confirms the overcoming of subject/object and the unity of truth and 
freedom. 
 
Muungano ni wazo lilozaliwa 
likadondoka mikononi mwa mkunga kipofu 
 
likawa kubwa kichwa cha mtoto. 
Ni fundo la tambara bovu gumu lilofungwa na 
Jitu. 
Sharti meno yatumike kulifunda 
mchanga ulo ndani umwagike 
kuchafua ndimi zisemazo ukweli-huru. 
 
Union is the thought born,  
that is dropped in the hands of the blind 
midwife 
And becomes like the head of a baby  
It is a bad and hard knot of tatters tied up by 
Object 
It is a must that teeth are used to pound 
sand that is inside to spill 
to tarnish the tongues that tell the truth-free. 
 
In this sense wa-kati is both a rewriting of the concepts of Heidegger and a critique 
of them. In so far as wa-kati is a rewriting, it shows that Kezilahabi accepted 
Heidegger´s concepts, but at the same time he rewrites them in the light of his 
own philosophy, creating a new concept.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Translation goes beyond the boundaries of occasional practice, during which a 
new play comes from the original one, and becomes usual practice. The 
translation of forms and meanings, of concepts and metaphors, becomes a transfer 
of meanings and rewriting. This study has proposed an analysis of this kind of 
dialogue between Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s works and those of the Swahili 
writer Kezilahabi. We have seen how Kezilahabi used transfer and rewriting in 
order to create meaning in his context for the purpose of unmasking and liberating.  
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In the first section, we identified the concepts of narcoticum and tonicum as 
common and connected concepts in Nietzsche's and Kezilhabi’s thoughts. The 
concept of tonicum and pain allowed us to analyse in depth the term kichomi 
making it appear as a rewriting of that pain expressed by Heidegger in Unterwegs 
zur Sprache, that is the pain that "divides" and "joins". Pain rends, but remains at 
the “threshold” that draws everything to itself. This is Unter-Schied (Difference), 
which allows the existence and it’s exactly the subject of the poem Fungueni 
Mlango (‘Open the Door’, then the threshold). Indeed, we can recognise mlango 
as a rewriting of Unter-Schied (‘Dif-ference’). We have also shown that the 
experience of pain, in literature, also means to experience fear; the etymology of 
Freud´s concept of unheimlich (‘eery, uncanny’) led us to explain the concepts of 
Heimat and journey.  
In the second section, we have seen how Kezilahabi transferred the process of 
Nietzschean unmasking; this is needed to search for truth. We should remember 
that truth for Kezilahabi coincides with freedom. We have also shown how this 
search for truth causes solitude, pain and a sense of homelessness, from which 
derives the transfer of the journey. This process is necessary to the dual release of 
African Being. On the one hand, being has to be released from the primacy of 
morality and ethnicity, and on the other hand from the Western Weltanschauung. 
Here, too, both German philosophers are landmarks of reflection for the Swahili 
author, not only to distance himself from the Western Weltanschauung, but also 
because Kezilahabi uses their ideas as tools to investigate the African world and 
subject it to the same criticism. We have also seen how the concepts of heimat, 
homelessness, journey and new heimat, have been developed in the poetry of 
Kezilahabi in dialogue with Heidegger and Nietzsche. These elements are 
essential for the pursuit of truth and, considering that truth coincides with freedom 
in Kezilahabi’s work, for the process of liberation. 
In the third section, we have analysed the rewriting of key terms and concepts 
of Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophy. We have seen how the allegorical 
description of Nietzsche's eternal return has been rewritten according to the 
culture of Ukerewe Island in Lake Victoria in Tanzania where Kezilahabi has his 
origins. Through an investigation of the name “Nagona” it was possible to 
discover some important connections with the Nietzschean Übermensch. Based 
on these elements, we have seen how Kezilahabi arrived at a synthesis of linear 
and circular time suggesting a spiral. Time is at the core of Kezilahabi’s 
reflections and his ontological and existential ideas. Between “be” and 
“becoming” there is no difference, the potential future is inherent in the present. 
Thus, we have seen how Kezilahabi, in dialogue with and in opposition to Martin 
Heidegger, rewrites his Mitdasein (Be-there-with) and Unter-Schied (Between-
the rift) turning it into wa-kati (be-between). 
Recognising rewriting is fundamental for the exegesis of Kezilahabi’s texts, 
because in this way we are able to make a comparative analysis. This lets us make 
a deep interpretation of the texts and also recognise their cultural, allegoric and 
politic value. The description of these elements of transferring, rewriting and 
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influence shows an original philosophy beyond the borders. However, since these 
rewritings and transfers reflect on Nietzsche and Heidegger’s philosophy – their 
“lenses in our own eyes” (Kezilahabi 1985: 239) – they push forward – in different 
time and space – these philosophers. Thus, they are a document of the African 
reception of these philosophers, that belongs to the history of reception and 
hermeneutics of the texts of Nietzsche and Heidegger. This does not mean that 
Kezilahabi´s philosophy is only a reworking of what he has been influenced by, 
but rather it shows his capacity for dialogue and his ability to propose a 
philosophy and aesthetics – with his own choices (Gaudioso, 2010a, 2013b, 2015) 
– that are tragically current, or to use the words of Nietzsche, constantly 
Unzeitgemäss (anachronistic). The philosophy of Euphrase Kezilahabi, together 
with his poetics, is able to rework and push forward universal thinking and the 
aesthetic literary experience, proposing new challenges for the future.  
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